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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to encourage the discussion of the 
potential place and value of digital forensics techniques when 
dealing with acquisitions on removable media in the field of 
digital curation. It examines a basic computer forensics process, 
discusses a typical file system for removable media, and raises 
questions about necessary processes and incentives for addressing 
data capture in the field of digital curation. 
General Terms 
K.6.m Miscellaneous 
Keywords 
Computer, Computer Forensics, Digital, Digital Forensics, Digital 
Curation, Archival 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As has been noted in past papers, information is an extremely 
valuable asset in the world’s increasingly globally networked 
environment [1]. The digital revolution has contributed to a 
radical paradigm transformation in today’s information rich 
societies. Many of society’s basic operational components such as 
financial markets, health care, and governmental agencies depend 
on information in digital formats.  
An excellent example of the growth in digital information is 
provided by the White House. In 1978, Congress passed the 
Presidential Records Act, “which requires each president to 
maintain records of all activities, deliberations, decisions and 
policies that reflect on performance in office” [2]. There have 
been questions in the press as to whether the National Achieves 
can handle the volume of digital data produced during the Bush 
administration [3]. It has been estimated by archive officials that 
the “… electronic record(s) of the Bush years (are) about 50 times 
as large as that left by the Clinton White House in 2001” [3].  
This paper discusses the potential place and value of digital 
forensics techniques for collecting institutions (e.g., libraries, 
museums, archives) that are dealing with acquisitions on 
removable media. The hope is that this paper will encourage 
future research in the adoption of computer forensics processes 
and tools for digital curation. 
2. COMPUTER FORENSICS PROCESS 
This section summarizes a typical digital forensics workflow.  
2.1 Process for Retrieving Data  
For this discussion, consider the forensic acquisition of a data 
key, a.k.a. thumb drive. One must first decide where to store the 
information. In order to counter data remembrance so that it does 
not contaminate the information stored on the target drive, the 
target drive needs to be forensically cleaned. This means that the 
target drive is wiped by writing all zeros or ones to the drive. 
Many companies promote a US Department of Defense (DOD) 
standard on this topic. However, the 2006 National Industry 
Security Program Operating Manual (that is also referenced as the 
DOD 5220.22-M) does not specify the number of passes required 
to achieve sanitation [4].  
The Defense Security Service (DSS) Clearing and Sanitization 
Matrix which was updated on June 28, 2007, makes the statement 
that “DSS will no longer approve overwriting procedures for the 
sanitization or downgrading (e.g. release to lower level classified 
information controls) of IS storage devices (e.g., hard drives) used 
for classified processing” [5]. There is clearly controversy over 
the effectiveness of overwriting drives. A recent study that claims 
“…that correctly wiped data cannot reasonably be retrieved even 
if it is of a small size or found only over small parts of the hard 
drive” [6]. Even thought there appears to be a doubt as to the 
effectiveness of overwriting for sanitation purposes, it is still a 
good idea from a forensic practice perspective. 
The next activity is to document the hardware. This includes any 
serial numbers and manufacturer information. The next activity in 
a forensic situation would be to start the chain of custody and to 
transport the device to a secure lab for processing. 
At this point, a bit-stream copy of the removable media should be 
made by creating either a clone or a forensic image of the device. 
A bit-stream copy of the removable media copies every bit on the 
source drive [7]. When a bit-stream copy is saved to another 
drive, i.e., the target drive (generally, this drive needs to be 
identical to the source) so that the target drive is bootable, this is 
commonly referred to as a clone. When the bit-stream copy is 
saved to an image file, this is commonly referred to as a forensic 
image. It is possible to take a forensic image and restore the 
image to a drive making a clone of the source drive. 
At this point, the forensic copy of the removable media then 
needs to be authenticated. This is typically done through the 
execution of a one-way hash on both devices to verify that they 
are identical.  
The next step is the analysis of the drive to identify active files 
and inactive files. Active files are readily identifiable and can be 
accessed with the appropriate software and, in some cases, the 
required security information. Inactive files can be located by 
carving the unallocated space and slack space off of the drive. 
Unallocated space is space that has not been used by the file 
system. It can contain deleted documents in Windows and DOS 
operating systems. Information can also be found in two types of 
unallocated slack space: file slack and RAM slack (sometimes 
both are referred to as drive slack) [7]. Any anomalies that are 
identified such as encrypted information, proprietary software 
formats and missing partitions are noted and examined 
individually. All of the information that is found would be 
documented appropriately. 
The documentation is very detailed so that it includes all of the 
issues that were encountered and the evidence that was discovered 
in the process. It will also include the methods utilized in the 
investigation along with citations supporting the analysts’ stated 
opinions.   
2.2 Removable Media File Systems 
The next issue to address is the file system. It can be argued that 
the file system is part of the application layer, the presentation 
layer and the session layer as defined in the Open Systems 
Interconnection (OSI) seven-layer model [8]. The file system is 
responsible for the organization of the files, i.e., it is responsible 
for the logical placement of the files on the storage drive. Hence, 
the file system is manipulating the sectors on a drive so that they 
are treated as clusters. These clusters are then linked together, as 
needed, so that they can be treated as a file with associated 
metadata. The size of the clusters will vary depending on the size 
of the hard disk and the file system [7]. Understanding this 
interaction is critical to the retrieval of data that has been 
accidentally or intentionally deleted on various types of files 
systems like the File Allocation Table (FAT) system, New 
Technology File System (NTFS), High Performance File System 
(HPFS) or the Hierarchical File System (HFS). 
It is common, although not mandatory, for data keys to use a 
version of the File Allocation Table (FAT) system. When a file is 
deleted in a FAT system, the first character of the file is replaced 
with a non-readable character and the FAT entries linking the 
sector clusters are zeroed out. The data still exist on the system. 
The zeroing out of the entries linking the clusters simply tells the 
file system that the space is available for use. Hence, to restore a 
file, the name of the file would need to be amended and the links 
between the sector clusters would need to be re-established. If 
additional data has been saved to the system after a file has been 
deleted, the old data may have been over written. 
3. INFORMATION APPLICATION  
Now that we have an understanding of the basics of computer 
forensics, how can we apply this to the field of digital curation? 
In the case of the White house and the Presidential Records Act, 
does the administration have an obligation to not delete 
information? Does the archivist have an obligation to recover as 
much information as is possible from the digital media provided 
by the administration? If so, how does the archivist achieve this 
goal?  
4. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK  
This paper is intended to raise awareness of computer forensics 
concepts and to prompt discussion about the potential use and the 
need for computer forensics processes and tools in the field of 
digital curation. The long-term implications, obstacles, and 
hurtles for the integration of digital forensics processes and 
techniques into the field of digital curation are not fully 
understood. It is clear that the digital revolution will continue to 
penetrate all aspects of our globally networked information rich 
society. This continued integration raises the need to address the 
amount of information that is archived along with the examination 
of the processes that are implemented. 
There are many associated questions to consider: 
 When collecting institutions receive removable media, 
what procedures do they follow? 
 Do they only capture “live files,” or do they also 
capture deleted files? 
 Under what conditions would it be beneficial for 
collecting institutions to copy entire drives, i.e. all of 
the bits, rather than only copying the live files from the 
drives? 
 Are current practices of collecting institutions practical 
from a business perspective?  To what extent do they 
conform to established digital forensics principles and 
practices? 
 How often, and under what conditions, will the 
processes and storage arrangements of collecting 
institutions need to be upheld in a court of law? 
Future research could focus on a closer examination of the 
process used in the field of digital curation. This can include 
conducting survey inquiries with collecting institutions in several 
different countries. It could also include the investigation and 
development of a digital recovery methodology specifically for 
use in digital curation. It could reasonably include a targeted 
educational effort toward librarians and archivists on relevant 
tools and the operation of specific file systems. The educational 
effort could be followed by empirical studies of the practicality 
and effectiveness of the developed methodologies to meet the 
needs of collecting institutions and their target user communities  
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